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ABSTRACT
We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approx-
imate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games
with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold’em
Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable, performs only basic
iterations (i.e matvec multiplications, clipping, etc., and no calls
to external first-order oracles, no matrix inversions, etc.), and is
applicable to a broad class of two-person zero-sum games including
simultaneous games and sequential games with incomplete informa-
tion and perfect recall. The applicability to the latter kind of games
is thanks to the sequence-form representation which allows us to
encode any such game as a matrix game with convex polytopial
strategy profiles. We prove that the number of iterations needed
to produce a Nash-equilibrium with a given precision is inversely
proportional to the precision. As proof-of-concept, we present
experimental results on matrix games on simplexes and Kuhn Poker.
Index Terms— Nash-equilibrium, sequential games, incom-
plete information, perfect recall, convex optimization
1 Introduction
A game-theoretic approach to playing games strategically optimally
consists of computing Nash-equilibria (in fact, approximations
thereof) offline, and playing one’s part (an optimal behavioral strat-
egy) of the equilibrium online. This technique is the driving-force
behind solution concepts like CFR [1, 2, 3], CFR+ [4] and other vari-
ants, which have recently had profound success in Poker. However,
solving games for equilibria remains a mathematical and compu-
tational challenge, especially in sequential games with imperfect
information. In this paper, we propose (our detailed contributions
are sketched in subsection 1.3 below and elaborated in section 3) a
simple primal-dual algorithm for solving for such equilibria approx-
imately (in a sense to be made precise in Definition 3 below).
1.1 Statement of the problem
The sequence-form representation for two-person zero-sum
games with incomplete information was introduced in [5], and the
theory was further developed in [6, 7, 8] where it was established
that for such games, there exist sparse matrices A ∈ Rn1×n2 ,
E1 ∈ Rl1×n1 , E2 ∈ Rl2×n2 , and vectors e1 ∈ Rl1 , e2 ∈ Rl2
such that n1, n2, l1, and l2 are all linear in the size of the game tree
(number of states in the game) and such that Nash-equilibria cor-
respond to pairs (x, y) of realization plans which solve the primal
LCP (Linear Convex Program)
minimize
(y,p)∈Rn2×Rl1
〈e1, p〉 subject to: y ≥ 0, E2y = e2,
−Ay + ET1 p ≥ 0,
(1)
and the dual LCP
maximize
(x,q)∈Rn1×Rl2
− 〈e2, q〉 subject to: x ≥ 0, E1x = e1,
ATx+ ET2 q ≥ 0.
(2)
The vectors p = (p0, p1, ..., pl2−1) ∈ Rl2 and q = (q0, q1, ..., ql1−1) ∈
Rl1 are dual variables. A is the payoff matrix and each Ek is a ma-
trix whose entries are−1, 0 or 1, with exactly 1 entry per row which
equals−1 except for the first whose whose first entry is 1 and all the
others are 0. Each of the vectors ek is of the form (1, 0, ..., 0).
The LCPs above have the equivalent saddle-point formulation
minimize
y∈Q2
maximize
x∈Q1
〈x,Ay〉, (3)
where the compact convex polytope
Qk := {z ∈ Rnk |z ≥ 0, Ekz = ek} ⊆ [0, 1]nk (4)
is identified with the strategy profile of player k in the sequence-
form representation. At a feasible point (y, p, x, q) for the LCPs, the
duality gap G˜(y, p, x, q) is given by1
0 ≤ G˜(y, p, x, q) := 〈e1, p〉 − (−〈e2, q〉) = 〈e1, p〉+ 〈e2, q〉
= G(x, y) := max{〈u,Ay〉 − 〈x,Av〉|(u, v) ∈ Q1 ×Q2}.
(5)
In (5), the quantityG(x, y) is nothing but the primal-dual gap for
the equivalent saddle-point problem (3). It was shown (see Theorem
3.14 of [8]) that a pair (x, y) ∈ Q1 × Q2 of realization plans is a
solution to the LCPs (1) and (2) (i.e is a Nash-equilibrium for the
game) if and only if there exist vectors p and q such that
−Ay + ET1 p ≥ 0, ATx+ ET2 q ≥ 0, 〈x,−Ay + ET1 p〉 = 0,
〈y,ATx+ ET2 q〉 = 0.
(6)
Moreover, at equilibria strong duality holds and the value of the
game equals p0 = −q0, i.e the duality gap G˜(y, p, x, q) defined
in (5) vanishes at equilibria.
Definition 1 (Nash -equilibria). Given  > 0, a Nash -equilibrium
is a pair (x∗, y∗) of realization plans for which there exists dual vec-
tors p∗ and q∗ for problems (1) and (2) such that the duality gap at
(y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) doesn’t exceed . That is,
0 ≤ G˜(y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ≤ . (7)
1.2 A remark concerning matrix games on simplexes
It should be noted that any matrix A ∈ Rn1×n2 specifies a ma-
trix game with payoff matrix A, for which player k’s strategy profile
is a simplex
∆nk :=
{
z ∈ Rnk |z ≥ 0,
∑
j
zj = 1
}
. (8)
This simplex can be written as a compact convex polytope in the
form (4) by taking Ek := (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ R1×nk and ek = 1 ∈ R1.
Thus every matrix game on simplexes can be seen as a sequential
game, and so the results presented in this manuscript can be triv-
ially applied such games in particular. For this special sub-class of
sequential games, the duality gap function G(x, y) writes
G(x, y) = max{〈u,Ay〉 − 〈x,Av〉|(u, v) ∈ ∆n1 ×∆n2}
= max
0≤i<n1
(Ay)i − min
0≤j<n2
(ATx)j .
(9)
1The first inequality being due to weak duality.
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1.3 Quick sketch of our contribution
We now give a brief overview of our contributions, which will
be made more elaborate in section 3. Developing on an alternative
notion of approximate equilibria (see Definition 3) homologous to
that presented in Definition 1, we device a simple numerically sta-
ble primal-dual algorithm that (Algorithm 1) for computing approxi-
mate Nash-equilibria in sequential two-person zero-sum games with
incomplete information and perfect recall. On, each iteration, the
only operations performed by our algorithm are of the form ATx,
Ay, ET1 p, ET2 q, and (x)+ := (max(0, xj))j . We also prove (Theo-
rem 1) that –in an ergodic / Cesa`rio sense– the number of iterations
required by the algorithm to produce an approximation equilibrium
to a precision  is O(1/), with explicit values for the constants in-
volved.
1.4 Notation and terminology
General. Let m and n be positive integers. The components of a
vector z ∈ Rn will be denoted z0, z1, ..., zn−1 (indexing begins from
0, not 1). Rn+ := {z ∈ Rn | z ≥ 0} is the nonnegative nth orthant.
‖z‖ denotes the 2-norm of z defined by ‖z‖ := √〈z, z〉. Given a
matrix A ∈ Rm×n, its spectral norm, denoted ‖A‖, is defined to be
the largest singular value ofA, i.e the largest eigenvalue ofATA (or
equivalently, of AAT ).
Convex analysis. Given a subset C ⊆ Rn, iC denotes the in-
dicator function of C defined by iC(x) = 0 if x ∈ C and +
∞ otherwise. At times, we will write ix∈C for iC(x) (to ease no-
tation, etc.). For example, we will write iz≥0 for iRn+(z), etc. The
orthogonal projector onto C, is the “closest-point” map projC :
Rn → C, x 7→ argmin
z∈C
1
2
‖z − x‖2. Let f : Rn → (−∞,+∞] be a
convex function. The effective domain of f , denoted dom(f), is de-
fined as dom(f) := {x ∈ Rn|f(x) < +∞}. If dom(f) 6= ∅ then
we say f is proper. The subdifferential of f at a point x ∈ Rn is de-
fined by ∂f(x) := {v ∈ Rn|f(z) ≥ f(x)+〈v, z−x〉, ∀z ∈ Rn}. If
f is convex, its proximal operator is the function proxf : R
n → Rn
defined by proxf (x) := argmin
z∈Rn
1
2
‖z − x‖2 + f(z).
We recommend [9, 10] for a more detailed exposition on convex
analysis and its use in modern optimization theory and practice.
2 Prior work
Here, we present a selection of algorithms that is representative of
the efforts that have been made in the literature to compute Nash -
equilibria for two-person zero-sum games with incomplete informa-
tion like Texas Hold’em Poker, etc. It should be noted that the class
of games considered here (sequential games with incomplete infor-
mation), the LCPs (1) and (2) are exceedingly larger than what state-
of-the-art LCP and interior-point solvers can handle (see [11, 12]).
2.1 Regret minimization
CFR (CounterFactual Regret minimization) [1], Monte Carlo
CFR [2], and CFR+ [3], by their large popularity, have become the
definitive state-of-the-art, and are particularly useful in many-player
games, since convex-analytical methods cannot help much in such
games. Also, they can be shown to converge to a Nash-equilibrium
provided each player uses a CFR scheme to play the game [1], but
have a much weaker convergence theory. For example, [2] showed
that such schemes have a prohibitive running time of O(1/2) to
produce a Nash -equilibrium.
2.2 First-order methods
In [11], a nested iterative procedure using the Excessive Gap
Technique (EGT) [13] (EGT and precursors are well-known to the
signal-processing community [14]) was used to solve the equilib-
rium problem (3). The authors reported a O(1/) convergence rate
(which derives from the general EGT theory) for the outer-most
iteration loop. [12] proposed a modified version of the techniques
in [11] and proved a O ((‖A‖/δ) log (1/)) convergence rate in
terms of the number of calls made to a first-order oracle. Here
δ = δ(A,E1, E2, e1, e2) > 0 is a certain condition number for the
game. The crux of their technique was to observe that (3) can further
be written a the minimization of the duality gap function G(x, y)
(defined in (5)) for the game2, viz
minimize{G(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ Q1 ×Q2}, (10)
and then show there exists a scalar δ > 0 such that for any pair of
realization plans (x, y) ∈ Q1 ×Q2,
“distance between (x, y) and set of equilibria” ≤ G(x, y)/δ. (11)
Their algorithm is then derived by iteratively applying Nesterov
smoothing [15] with a geometrically decreasing sequence of toler-
ance levels n+1 = n/γ (with γ > 1) G. However, there are a
number of issues, most notably: (a) The constant δ > 0 can be arbi-
trarily small, and so the factor ‖A‖/δ in the O ((‖A‖/δ) log (1/))
convergence rate can be arbitrarily large for ill-conditioned games.
(b) The reported linear convergence rate is not in terms of basic
operations (addition, multiplication, matvec, clipping, etc.), but in
terms of the number of calls to a first-order oracle. Most notably,
projections onto the polytopes Qk are computed on each iteration, a
very hard sub-problem.
Recently, [16] proposed accelerations to first-order methods for
computing Nash-equilibria (including those just discussed), by an
appropriate choice of the underlying Bregman distance and the dis-
tance generating function (essential ingredients in EGT-type algo-
rithms). These modifications provably gain a constant factor in the
worst-case convergence rate over the original algorithm.
2.3 Primal-dual algorithms
The primal-dual algorithm first developed in [17], was proposed
in [18] as a way of solving matrix games on simplexes. Notably,
such matrix games on simplexes are considerably simpler than the
games considered here. Indeed, the authors in [18] used the fact that
computing the orthogonal projection of a point onto a simplex can be
done in linear time as in [19]. In contrast, no such efficient algorithm
is known nor is likely to exist, for the polytopes Qk defined in (4).
That notwithstanding, such projections can still be done iteratively
using for example, the algorithm in proposition 4.2 of [20] or the
algorithms developed in [21]. Unfortunately, as with any nested it-
erative scheme, one would have to solve this sub-problem with finer
and finer precision, rendering the overall solver impractical. One can
also cite [22], in which the authors endeavored an iterative projection
algorithm onto polytopes in outer representation.
Other than the difficult projection sub-problem just discussed,
the duality gap might explode even at points arbitrarily close to the
set of feasible points, leaving the algorithm with no indication what-
soever, on whether progress is being made.
3 Our contributions
3.1 Generalized Saddle-point Problem (GSP) equivalent
for Nash-equilibrium LCPs
In the next theorem, we show that the LCPs (1) and (2) can be
conveniently written as a GSP in the sense of [23]. The crux of idea
is to remove the linear constraints in the definitions of the strategy
polytopes Qk, by augmenting the payoff matrix to yield an equiva-
lent saddle-point problem. The result is an equivalent game with un-
bounded strategy profiles (nonnegative orthants) with much simpler
geometry. We elaborate the construction in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Define two proper closed convex functions
g1 : Rn2 × Rl1 → (−∞,+∞], g1(y, p) := iy≥0 + 〈e1, p〉
g2 : Rn1 × Rl2 → (−∞,+∞], g2(x, q) := ix≥0 + 〈e2, q〉
}
(12)
Also define two bilinear forms Ψ1, Ψ2 : Rn2×Rl1×Rn1×Rl2 → R
by letting
K :=
[
A −ET1
E2 0
]
, Ψ1(y, p, x, q) :=
〈[
x
q
]
,K
[
y
p
]〉
, (13)
2The minimizers ofG are precisely the equilibria of the game.
with Ψ2 = −Ψ1, and define the functions Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2Rn2×Rl1×Rn1×
Rl2 → (−∞,+∞] by
Ψˆ1(y, p, x, q) :=
{
Ψ1(y, p, x, q) + g1(y, p), if y ≥ 0,
+∞, otherwise
Ψˆ2(y, p, x, q) :=
{
Ψ2(y, p, x, q) + g2(x, q), if x ≥ 0,
+∞, otherwise.
(14)
Finally, define the sets S1 := Rn2+ × Rl1 and S2 := Rn1+ ×
Rl2 , and consider the GSP(Ψ1, Ψ2, g1, g2): Find a quadruplet
(y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ∈ S1 × S2 s.t ∀(y, p, x, q) ∈ S1 × S2, we have
Ψˆ1(y
∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ≤ Ψˆ1(y, p, x∗, q∗), and
Ψˆ2(y
∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ≤ Ψˆ2(y∗, p∗, x, q).
(15)
Then GSP(Ψ1, Ψ2, g1, g2) is equivalent to the LCPs (1) and (2), i.e
a quadruplet (y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ∈ Rn2 × Rl1 × Rn1 × Rl2 solves the
LCPs (1) and (2) iff it solves GSP(Ψ1, Ψ2, g1, g2).
Proof. It suffices to show that at any point (y, p, x, q) ∈ S1×S2, the
duality gap between the primal LCP (1) and the dual LCP (2) equals
the duality gap of GSP(Ψ1, Ψ2, g1, g2). Indeed, the unconstrained
objective in (1), say a(x, y), can be computed as
a(y, p) = 〈e1, p〉+ iy≥0 + i−Ay+ET1 p≥0 + iE2y=e2
= g1(y, p) + max
x′≥0
〈x′, Ay − ET1 p〉+ max
q′
〈q′, E2y − e2〉
= g1(y, p) + max
x′,q′
〈x′, Ay〉 − 〈x′, ET1 p〉+ 〈q′, E2y〉
− (ix′≥0 + 〈e2, q〉)
= g1(y, p)− min
x′,q′
Ψ2(y, p, x
′, q′) + g2(x
′, q′)
= g1(y, p)− min
x′,q′
Ψˆ2(y, p, x
′, q′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ2(y,p)
= g1(y, p)− φ2(y, p).
Similarly, the unconstrained objective, say b(x, q), in the dual LCP
(2) writes
b(x, q) = −〈q, e2〉 − ix≥0 − iAT x+ET2 q≥0 − iE1x=e1
= −g2(x, q) + min
y′≥0
〈y′, ATx+ ET2 q〉+ min
p′
〈p′, e1 − E1x〉
= −g2(x, q) + min
y′,p′
Ψ1(y
′, p′, x, q) + g1(y
′, p′)
= −g2(x, q) + min
y′,p′
Ψˆ1(y
′, p′, x, q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ1(x,q)
= −g2(x, q) + φ1(x, q).
Thus, noting that −∞ < φ1(x, q), φ2(y, p) < +∞ (so that all the
operations below are valid), one computes the duality gap between
the primal LCP (1) and dual the LCP (2) at (y, p, x, q) as
a(y, p)− b(x, q) = g1(y, p)− φ2(y, p) + g2(x, q)− φ1(x, q)
= Ψ1(y, p, x, q) + g1(y, p)− φ2(y, p) + Ψ2(y, p, x, q) + g2(x, q)
− φ1(x, q)
= Ψˆ1(y, p, x, q)− φ1(x, q) + Ψˆ2(y, p, x, q)− φ2(y, p)
= duality gap of GSP(Ψ1,Ψ2, g1, g2) at (y, p, x, q),
where the second equality follows from Ψ1 + Ψ2 := 0.
By Theorem 1, solving for a Nash-equilibrium for the game is
equivalent to solving the GSP (15), which as it turns out, is simpler
conceptually (e.g, we no longer need to compute the complicated or-
thogonal projections projQk ). The rest of the paper will be devoted
to developing an algorithm for solving the latter.
3.2 The proposed algorithm
We now derive the algorithm (Algorithm 1) for computing Nash
(, 0)-equilibria and establish its theoretical properties. The algo-
rithm, which emerges as a synthesis of Theorem 1 above and ideas
from [23], is numerically stable and performs only basic iterations
(i.e matvec multiplications, clipping, etc., and no calls to external
first-order oracles, no matrix inversions, etc.).
Definition 2. Given  > 0 and a function f : Rn → (−∞,+∞],
the -enlarged subdifferential (or -subdifferential, for short) of f is
the set-valued function defined by
∂f(x) := {v ∈ Rn|f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈v, z − x〉 − ,∀z ∈ Rn}. (16)
The idea behind -subdifferentials is the following. Say we wish
to minimize a convex function f . Replace the usual necessary and
sufficient condition “0 ∈ ∂f(x)” for the optimality of x with the
weaker condition “∂f(x) contains a sufficiently small vector v”.
This approximation concept for subdifferentials yields yet another
notion of approximate Nash-equilibrium. the following concept of
approximate Nash-equilibria (refer to [23]), namely
Definition 3 (Nash (1, 2)-equilibria). Given tolerance levels
1, 2 > 0, a Nash (1, 2)-equilibrium for the GSP (15) is any
quadruplet (x∗, y∗, x∗, q∗) for which there exists a perturbation
vector v∗ such that ‖v∗‖ ≤ 1 and v∗ ∈ ∂2 [Ψˆ1(., ., x∗, q∗) +
Ψˆ2(y
∗, p∗, ., .)](y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗). Such a vector v∗ is called a Nash
(1, 2)-residual at the point (x∗, y∗, x∗, q∗).
The above definition is a generalization of the notion of Nash-
equilibria since: (a) exact Nash-equilibria correspond to Nash (0, 0)-
equilibria, and (b) Nash -equilibria (in the sense of Definition 1)
correspond to Nash (0, )-equilibria.
Algorithm 1 Primal-dual algorithm for computing Nash (, 0)-
equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games
Require:  > 0; (y(0), p(0), x(0), q(0)) ∈ Rn2 ×Rl1 ×Rn1 ×Rl2 .
Ensure: A Nash (, 0)-equilibrium (y∗, p∗, x∗, q∗) ∈ S1 × S2 for
the GSP (15).
1: Initialize: λ← 1/‖K‖, v(0) ← 0, k ← 0
2: while k = 0 or 1
kλ
‖v(k)‖ ≥  do
3: y(k+1) ← (y(k) − λ(ATx(k) + ET2 q(k)))+, p(k+1) ←
p(k) − λ(e1 − E1x(k))
4: x(k+1) ← (x(k) + λ(Ay(k+1) − ET1 p(k+1)))+,
∆x(k+1) ← x(k+1) − x(k)
5: ∆q(k+1) ← λ(E2y − e2), q(k+1) ← q(k) + ∆q(k+1)
6: y(k+1) ← y(k+1) − λ(AT∆x(k+1) + ET2 ∆q(k+1)),
∆y(k+1) ← y(k+1) − y(k)
7: p(k+1) ← p(k+1) + λE1∆x(k+1), ∆p(k+1) ← p(k+1) −
p(k)
8: v(k+1) ← v(k) + (∆y(k+1),∆p(k+1),∆x(k+1),∆q(k+1))
9: k ← k + 1
10: end while
Theorem 2 (Ergodic / Cesa`rio O(1/) convergence). Let d0 be the
euclidean distance between the starting point (y(0), p(0), x(0), q(0))
of Algorithm 1 and the set of equilibria for the GSP (15). Then given
any  > 0, there exists an index k0 ≤ 2d0‖K‖ such that after k0 iter-
ations the algorithm produces a quadruplet (yk0 , pk0 , xk0 , qk0) and
a vector vk0 such that ‖vk0a ‖ ≤  and vk0a ∈ ∂[Ψˆ1(., ., xk0 , qk0) +
Ψˆ2(y
k0 , pk0 , ., .)](yk0 , pk0 , xk0 , qk0), where
v(k0)a :=
1
kλ
v(k0). (17)
Thus Algorithm 1 outputs a Nash (, 0)-equilibrium for the GSP (15)
in at most 2d0‖K‖

iterations.
Proof. It is clear that the quadruplet (Ψ1,Ψ2, g1, g2) satisfies as-
sumptions B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5, and B.6 of [23] with Lxx = Lyy = 0
and Lxy = Lyx = ‖K‖. Now, one easily computes the proxi-
mal operator of gj in closed-form as proxλgj (a, b) ≡ ((a)+, b −
λej). With all these ingredients in place, Algorithm 1 is then ob-
tained from [23, Algorithm T-BD] applied on the GSP (15) with the
choice of parameters: σ = 1 ∈ (0, 1], σx = σy = 0 ∈ [0, σ),
λxy :=
1
σLxy
√
(σ2 − σ2x)(σ2 − σ2y) = σ/‖K‖ = 1/‖K‖, and
λ = λxy ∈ (0, λxy]. The convergence result then follows immedi-
ately from [23, Theorem 4.2].
3.3 Practical considerations
Efficient computation of Ay and ATx. In Algorithms 1, most of
the time is spent pre-multiplying vectors by A and AT . For flop-
type Poker games like Texas Hold’em and Rhode Island Hold’em,
A (and thus AT too) is very big (up 1014 rows and columns!) but
is sparse and has a rich block-diagonal structure (each block is itself
the Kronecker product of smaller matrices) which can be carefully
exploited, as in [11]. Also the sampling strategies presented in the
recent work [16] (section 6), for generating unbiased estimates of
Ay and ATx would readily convert Algorithm 1 into an online and
much scalable solver.
Computing ‖K‖. A major ingredient in the proposed algorithm
is ‖K‖, the 2-norm of the huge matrix K. This can be efficiently
computed using the power iteration. Also since ‖K‖ is only used
in defining the step-size λ := 1/‖K‖, it may be possible to avoid
computing ‖K‖ altogether, and instead use a line-search / backtrack
strategy (see [24], e.g) for setting λ.
Game abstraction. For many variants of Poker, there has been
extensive research in lossy / lossless abstraction techniques (for ex-
ample [25] and more recently, [26, 27]), wherein strategically equiv-
alent or not-so-different situations in the game tree are lumped to-
gether. This can drastically reduce the size of the state space from a
player’s perspective, and ultimately, the size of the matrices A, E1,
and E2, without significantly deviating much from the true game.
4 Numerical experiments results
We now present some proof-of-concept for the algorithm proposed.
Results are presented and commented in Figure 1.
Remark 1. We have not benchmarked our algorithm against the
algorithms proposed in [15] and Gilpin’s et al. [12] because im-
plementing them from scratch for such games would require us to
compute the complicated projections proxQk . We recall that avoid-
ing these projections was one of the goals of the manuscript.
4.1 Basic test-bed: Matrix games on simplexes
As in [15, 18], we generate a 1000×1000 random matrix whose
entries are uniformly identically distributed in the closed interval
[−1, 1]. The results of the experiments are shown in Figure 1(a).
4.2 Kuhn Poker, a “toy” sequential game
This game is a simplified form of Poker developed by Harold W.
Kuhn in [28]. It already contains all the complexities (sequentiality,
imperfection of information, etc.) of a full-blown Poker game like
Texas Hold’em, but is simple enough to serve as a proof-of-concept
for the ideas developed in this manuscript. The deck includes only
three playing cards: a King, Queen, and Jack. One card is dealt to
each player, then the first player must bet or pass, then the second
player may bet or pass. If any player chooses to bet the opposing
player must bet as well (”call”) in order to stay in the round. After
both players pass or bet, the player with the highest card wins the
pot. The pair of vectors (x∗, y∗) ∈ R13+13 given by
x∗ = [1, .759, .759, 0, .241, 1, .425, .575, 0, .275, 0, .275, .725]T ,
y∗ = [1, 1, 0, .667, .333, .667, .333, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1]T
is a Nash (10−4, 0)-equilibrium computed in 1500 iterations of Al-
gorithm 1. The convergence curves are shown in Fig 1. One easy
checks that this equilibrium is feasible. Indeed, one computes
E1x
∗ − e1 = [4.76 × 10−5,−1.91 × 10−5, 5.67 × 10−5, 8.23 ×
10−6, 2.90 × 10−5,−8.62 × 10−7,−1.96 × 10−5]T and E2y∗ −
e2 = [−7.04 × 10−7, 2.27 × 10−6,−3.29 × 10−6,−1.50 ×
10−6, 2.92× 10−6,−4.97× 10−7,−5.85× 10−7]T .
Finally, one checks that x∗TAy∗ = −0.05555, which agrees to
5 d.p with the value of −1/18 computed analytically by H. W.
Kuhn in his 1950 paper [28]. The evolution of the dual gap and the
expected value of the game across iterations are shown in Figure 1.
The results of the experiments are shown in Figure 1(b).
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Fig. 1: Convergence curves of Algorithm 1. We stress that the algorithms
of Nesterov [15] and Gilpin [12] are included in the plots only indicatively,
since this is not meant to be a benchmark as already explained (Remark 1).
In (a), the duality gaps are computed according to formula (9). One can see
the linear (i.e exponentially fast) behavior of the algorithm in [12], inbetween
consecutive breakpoints on the  grid (though the rate of linear convergence
seems to by quite close to 1 here). As expected, the first-order smoothing al-
gorithm labelled “Nesterov” [15] jitters around as the iterations go on because
even the smoothed problem becomes heavily ill-conditioned near solutions.
(b): Kuhn Poker. In the top-right plot, we show the modified duality gap
defined in (17) In both cases, we see that the proved convergence rate for our
algorithm is empirically observed.
5 Concluding remarks and future work
Making use of the sequence-form representation [5, 7, 8], we have
devised a simple numerically stable primal-dual algorithm for com-
puting Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games
with incomplete information (like Texas Hold’em, etc.). Our algo-
rithm is simple to implement, with a low constant cost per iteration,
and enjoys a rigorous convergence theory with a proven O(1/)
convergence in terms of basic operations (matvec products, clip-
ping, etc.), to a Nash (, 0)-equilibrium of the game. In future,
we plan to run more experiments on real Poker games to measure
the practical power of the proposed algorithm compared to other
competed schemes like CFR and EGT.
In conclusion, Nash-equilibrium problems are saddle-point
convex-concave problems, and as such, a natural tool for tackling
them would be proximal primal-dual / operator-splitting algorithms,
and we believe such methods will receive more attention in the
algorithmic game theory community in future.
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